I propose a neuroscience and animat research-inspired model and a thought experiment to test the hypothesis of a developmental relation between fluid and crystallized intelligence. I propose that crystallized intelligence is the result of well-defined activities and structures, whereas fluid intelligence is the physiological catalytic adaptation mechanism responsible for coordinating and regulating the crystallized structures. We can design experiments to reproduce exemplified normal and anomalous phenomena, especially disorders, and study possible cognitive treatments. (Published Online April 5 2006).

We challenge and extend Ainslie's top-down view of willpower as a dual function, resolve and suppression. Instead, we propose an alternative self-organizational view of the motivational system as a network of urges, incentives, drives, and so on that interact dynamically. With such a view, resolve, suppression, and other functions emerge under certain environmental and social conditions for certain personality profiles.

La plus grande épave du Ve s. av. J.-C. connue à ce jour a été découverte récemment au large de l'île d'Alonnissos, dans les Sporades du Nord. Le navire, chargé d'une cargaison de vin, sombra durant le dernier quart du Ve s. av. J.-C. par 30 m de profondeur. Il était chargé d'amphores vinaires de la ville de Mendè, sur la côte de Macédoine, et de l'île de Skopélos, célèbres toutes deux dans l'Antiquité pour la qualité de leur vin, exporté (...) dans toute la Méditerranée et jusqu'en mer Noire. Le navire transportait aussi une abondante vaisselle de banquet à vernis noir d'origine athénienne. Les navires d'époque classique précédemment découverts en Grèce, à Chypre, en France, en Italie et en Israël ne dépassaient pas 17 m de long et 4 m de large. L'épave d'Alonnissos mesure au moins 25 m de long et 10 m de large : elle constitue le premier témoignage archéologique de l'existence en Méditerranée dès le Ve s. av. J.-C. de bateaux marchands jaugeant plus de 100 tonnes. (shrink)

In this short, dense essay, Jean Cavaillès evaluates philosophical efforts to determine the origin - logical or ontological - of scientific thought, arguing that, rather than seeking to found science in original intentional acts, a priori meanings, or foundational logical relations, any adequate theory must involve a history of the concept. Cavaillès insists on a historical epistemology that is conceptual rather than phenomenological, and a logic that is dialectical rather than transcendental. His famous call (cited by Foucault) to abandon "a (...) philosophy of consciousness" for "a philosophy of the concept" was crucial in displacing the focus of philosophical enquiry from aprioristic foundations toward structural historical shifts in the conceptual fabric. This new translation of Cavaillès's final work, written in 1942 during his imprisonment for Resistance activities, presents an opportunity to reencounter an original and lucid thinker. Cavaillès's subtle adjudication between positivistic claims that science has no need of philosophy, and philosophers' obstinate disregard for actual scientific events, speaks to a dilemma that remains pertinent for us today. His affirmation of the authority of scientific thinking combined with his commitment to conceptual creation yields a radical defense of the freedom of thought and the possibility of the new. (shrink)

This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude toward envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy poses to political stability. Yet he also briefly discusses the kind of envy that individuals experience toward their social peers, which he calls particular envy, and which I refer to as peer envy. He quickly concludes, however, that particular envy would not present a serious risk to the stability of his just society. In this article, I contest (...) this claim by arguing that the principles that structure Rawls’s ideal society are likely to exacerbate particular envy to a politically risky extent. Section 1 reconstructs his account of envy, giving special attention to his belief that competition kindles envy between peers. Section 2 then examines the way in which Rawls often endorses rivalry within the body politic. I argue that the society governed by justice as fairness is, on account of this rivalry, likely to generate a politically problematic degree of particular envy. In Section 3, I invoke ancient Greece as an example of a society that was, as a result of its intense competitiveness, often imperiled by dangerously elevated levels of peer envy. I then survey the key institutional mechanisms by which the ancient Greeks sought to manage this hazardous emotion. It turns out, however, that most of these mechanisms would be unavailable to Rawls insofar as they starkly contravene his principles of justice. I conclude that if Rawlsians wish to establish a society that fosters rivalry, they would do well to reflect on the means by which peer envy can be effectively harnessed. (shrink)

Dewey's voluminous writings, spanning decades and reflecting the contrasting national moods of different historical periods, abound with tensions, not to say contradictions. In highlighting and working with a conflict within Dewey's commitments, then, I do not mean to be catching him out or correcting a mistake. The tension on which I focus is one with which he struggled for most of his philosophical career and one that he never satisfactorily resolved, yet it is also one that goes to the heart (...) of what it is to be a pragmatist. It involves the role of final ends in a philosophy that places practical reasoning at the heart of all knowledge. I will argue that while Dewey had powerful philosophical prejudices that prevented him from adequately dealing with this problem himself, a solution is nonetheless forthcoming that maintains, and perhaps even deepens, the main themes of his pragmatism. Setting out this solution will lead me, in the end, to a novel formulation of the pragmatist theory of truth. (shrink)

The critique of philosophical foundations of neoclassical economics is significant, because of its hegemony on economic education and research programs in Iran and worldwide academies. Due to an epistemological fallacy, methodological individualism plays a prominent role in the philosophy of economic; since the ontological aspects of economy are reduced to methodological considerations. Accordingly, critique of methodological individualism is regarded as the main entry for philosophical analysis of neoclassical economics. This article aims to analyze and appraise the methodological individualism from critical (...) realism’s point of view. Critical realism is taken as a stand for criticizing methodological individualism, because critical realism and neoclassical economics as a positive approach to economics, both share a realistic worldview. The critical realism’ critique of methodological individualism is bases on analyzing the concepts of formalism, syllogism, social atomism, isolation and reduction. From critical realism’ point of view because of unrealistic postulations of methodological individualism, neoclassical economics is turned to an abstract and deductive science such as mathematics with a low potentiality of explanation. (shrink)

Ptolemy reports three dated lunar eclipses observed by Hipparchus, and also refers to two more, without identifying them, which Hipparchus compared with two earlier counterparts (apparently, observed in Mesopotamia) to assess the validity of the Babylonian period relations of the lunar motion. Also, in Pliny the Elder’s Historia naturalis, we are told that a horizontal lunar eclipse (selenelion) at sunrise and moonset was reported (observed?) by Hipparchus. Reviewing a paper by G.J. Toomer in 1980, it is shown that the pairs (...) of the eclipses were, almost certainly, the ones occurring on “31 January 486 b.c. and 27 January 141 b.c.” and “19 November 502 b.c. and 14 November 157 b.c.”; and if Hipparchus observed from St. Stephen’s Hill in Rhodes, the most probable candidate for the selenelion at moonset was the lunar eclipse of 7 February 142 b.c., although he also had the chance to observe any of the four others, occurring on 3 July 150 b.c., 10 April 145 b.c., 26 November 139 b.c., and 15 November 138 b.c., on a sufficiently elevated mountain on the island. (shrink)

_This paper discusses the concept of compassion fatigue in light of the importance that political decisions, especially the application of the concept of public spirit, have had on care and nursing in a Danish hospital context during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper is based on recent research literature in the field as well as the author’s own participatory observation study. The paper suggests that nurses already show a sense of public spirit due to their authorization and professional ethics, but at (...) the same time they must balance the ambiguity of nursing care. A linguistic-philosophical study of public spirit shows that the concept can have a discursive, double-binding and interpellative effect on nurses, who may therefore have an experience of inadequacy and compassion fatigue. In this context, compassion fatigue must be understood as the fact that nurses cannot provide the care they want or that is expected of them. Public spirit can be said to have had a renaissance and linguistic and moral supremacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper views the concept of __waywardness 1 as a possible response for how to prevent or completely avoid compassion fatigue, so that nurses instead have an experience of compassion / self-compassion. This could in the end be important for encouraging more nursing students and nurses who have the desire and opportunity to stay in the profession._ _Keywords_: Nursing care, compassion fatigue, public spirit, compassion, COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The practical goal of preventing premature death seems uncontroversial. But the term ‘premature death’ is vague with several, sometimes conflicting definitions. This ambiguity results in several conceptions with which not all will agree. Moreover, the normative rationale behind the goal of preventing premature deaths is masked by the operational definition of existing measures. In this article, we argue that ‘premature death’ should be recognized as a normative concept. We propose that normative theories should be used to justify measures of premature (...) death to provide them with normative validity and public legitimacy. (shrink)

In the ground-breaking 2018 judgment of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India ushered in a new era by decriminalizing homosexuality, marking a pivotal moment in the country's legal history. However, this progressive stride was accompanied by persistent questions concerning homosexual rights that remained unexplored within both cultural and legal frameworks. Despite the legal acknowledgment, members of the homosexual community are often professed merely as 'individuals' and not fully integrated into mainstream society. This perception (...) is aggravated by the absence of a societal 'stamp of marriage,' reinforcing their marginalization. In the realm of Hindu law, the sanctity of marriage is deeply rooted in the scriptures, which explicitly define it as the union of 'two souls.' Remarkably, these very scriptures also assert that a soul is inherently without gender, elucidating that gender is a characteristic exclusive to the human body. It is crucial to recognize that Hindu law, including the relevant Acts, draws extensively from these scriptures, making them a fundamental source of legal principles. The legislation, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, essentially serves to codify and organize the pre-existing Hindu law without seeking to undermine the intrinsic values enshrined within the Holy Scriptures. This article aims to delve into the unaddressed aspects of homosexual rights within the contemporary legal framework, shedding light on the denied rights that persist. While global attitudes are progressing towards recognizing and safeguarding homosexual rights, the Indian government and cultural factors appear hesitant to renounce orthodox and conservative stances. This article seeks to analyse and critique these aspects, exploring the challenges hindering the full acceptance and integration of homosexual individuals into the broader societal fabric despite the transformative legal landscape initiated by the Navtej Singh Johar case. (shrink)

In this paper we seek to clarify the question of what exactly is meant by an “autonomous” decision or act by focusing on the most fundamental personal condition for deciding or acting autonomously. This basic personal requirement has often been overlooked in recent debates; where it has been seen, it is characterized in ways that are too demanding. What is meant here is an individual form of self-relation that seems to be constitutive for leading a life as a human and (...) is likely to be acquired very early in life. This significant personal self-relation has three essential aspects: a primal sense of “self-confidence”, a basic form of “self-assertiveness”, and a fundamental form of “self-esteem”. We will call this the “triple S condition” for autonomy. Our main thesis is that any decision or action which is not based on this triple S condition cannot be called “autonomous”. (shrink)

This article explores the contributions of nineteenth-century philosophers of habit to understanding the rigidity of desire. Focusing on the work of Félix Ravaisson, I argue that Of Habit (1838) makes sense of something that much queer theory fails to address in its investment in the subversion of identity: the tendency of desire to return to known objects and follow well-worn paths, a tendency that does not always result in the affirmation of norms or the consolidation of power. Of Habit offers (...) a new set of terms—crystallization, patterning, and necessity, among others—for comprehending the limits of desire’s flexibility without naturalizing gender or sexuality as permanently fixed or inherent. In so doing, it offers an alternative to queer theories that, indebted to Judith Butler’s performativity thesis, attribute the rigidities of sexual life entirely to the productive power of cultural prohibitions and discursively constructed norms. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that we need more research into concussions and other injuries with potential long-term effects in sport because such research underpins effective, evidence-based prevention, management, support, and treatment. This paper provides an analysis of the obligations of sports federations to support and facilitate such research, as well as an analysis of the role active participants in the sport should have in the research process. The paper focuses on concussion and concussion research, though very similar arguments apply to (...) other common sports injuries with potential long-term effects. The paper argues that sports federations have a moral obligation and a prudential interest in initiating, facilitating, and funding concussion research. This follows from their duty of care towards active participants and from considerations of reciprocity. The ability to discharge these research obligations depends on the resources available to a particular federation, but those who can discharge them should do so. The paper further argues that athletes and other active participants in sport should be involved in all aspects of the concussion research process from conception to design, i.e. that Active Participant Involvement and Engagement (APIE) should be a non-negotiable element of concussion research projects. This is supported by instrumental reasons, but also by philosophical argument based on standpoint epistemology and on ethical arguments related to the interests of active participants. Standpoint epistemology is the epistemological position that the knowledge a person has and can have depends on that person’s standpoint in the world. Keywords: Concussion, funding, participant involvement, sport, sport association, sport federation. (shrink)

Introduction Reza Davari Ardakni, the Iranian contemporary philosopher, distinguishes development from Western modernity; in that it considers modernity as natural and organic changes that Europe has gone through, but sees development as a planned design for implementing modernity in other countries. As a result, the closedness of development concerns only the developing countries, not Western modern ones. Davari emphasizes that the Western modernity has a universality that pertains to a unique reason and a unified world. The only way of thinking (...) in this world is a philosophical thought based on human self-centered reason, and given the pervasiveness of Western civilization. Therefore, Davari does not consider Westernization as mere imitation of Western customs and methods, but rather as a way of existence in the world. Westernization is a subjective view of the world and beings. Westernization is not optional, enabling non-Western people to avoid it. According to the Westernization scenario, the world today is entirely Westernized, and Davari considers Westernization as the inevitable fate of the people of this era, seeing two alternatives for them, both of which ultimately lead to the same destination, which is to embrace development; either they seize the power of science and technology and join the process of global modernization and participate in it, or they become subdued by this process and accept it without participation. Davari regards the first type of Westernization as active and the second type as passive. Problematique Therefore, underdevelopment is not a concept of the ancient world, nor even of a world between the ancient and the modern, or on the threshold of modernization. Underdevelopment is a condition of suspension and timelessness and being exposed to modernization. To escape the paradox of underdevelopment, which is the inevitable historical fate of non-modernized societies, Davari sees no way out other than embracing development. In other words, Westernized societies, which have become confused due to modernization, have no escape route other than turning to development. Therefore, some critics of Davari accuse the theory of Westernization of being a theoretical rupture. M. T. Tabatabaei, by rejecting the theoretical rupture in the theory of Westernization, believes that in the argument of Davari, we are only faced with a shift from a philosophical to an intellectual level. Tabatabaei, by avoiding providing a philosophical response to the critics of the theoretical rupture, believes that the introduction of active Westernization and collaboration in science and technology as a solution to escape from underdevelopment conditions, is only a shift from a philosophical level to an intellectual level and does not involve a rupture. Therefore, it seems that the philosophical issue of how or the possibility of escaping from underdevelopment conditions is still an open non answered problem. In this study, seeking a philosophical answer to this problem, an attempt has been made to summarize Davari's definitions of development, underdevelopment, participation in the world of science, and the role of humanities and social sciences in development, using his writings and speeches. It is proposed that a way to escape from the clesedness of development based on Davari's views, is to make use of analytical method with emphasizing on concepts and theories of the philosophy and metaphysics of science. Argument According to Davari, the social and human sciences that are responsible for development planning in underdeveloped societies must consider the characteristics of underdevelopment in order to facilitate the transition to more favorable conditions. Davari identifies the following conditions for successful development: 1) replacing tradition with science as the organizing and coordinating principle in society, 2) recognizing the universality of philosophy and science of the Western modernity and the impossibility of blindly imitation and adopting it, 3) inevitability of actively engaging and interacting with development, 4) recognizing the internal dynamics of scientific progress and avoiding authoritarian control, and 5) promoting free participation in the scientific paradigms. Therefore, Davari suggests the following steps towards development: 1) recognizing and understanding the problems of society and the local ecosystem, 2) understanding the philosophical and cultural foundations of Western civilization, 3) understanding the historical context and paradigms of science, 4) understanding the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of science, 5) recognizing the intellectual and philosophical capacities of our own community, and 6) reflecting our own philosophical and metaphysical assumptions in the scientific world in a way that is compatible with scientific methods. Given the motivations for change in science at both the global and national levels, including the emergence of heterodox or indigenous sciences, and the inevitable nature of development, Davari points to the possibility of a path between absolute rejecting or accepting the mainstream social and human sciences. However, this path is challenging and contingent upon the aforementioned conditions and steps of transition. Conclusion It is necessary to seek this path within the realm of the philosophy and metaphysics of science, particularly in the origins and foundations of the social and human sciences. Research in the metaphysics and philosophy of the social sciences provides the opportunity for active scientific engagement in the scientific paradigms and a reconsideration of the foundations of science, allowing for different philosophical foundations while are compatible with scientific methods. Successfully finding a path between absolute rejecting or accepting the existing social sciences will lead to an internal transformation within the field of science and, in fact, will advance the boundaries of knowledge. Therefore, it is possible, while adhering to the conditions of transition and actively participating in the world of science and technology, and accepting the unity of modernity and avoiding selectivity and imitation, to search for a way to overcome the closedness of development through a reconsideration of the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of science, while recognizing our own intellectual heritage and critically assessing Western science and technology. (shrink)

Classical Sanskrit commentary on Brahmasūtra; includes original Sanskrit text with English translation.

[1] The early years, 1878-1923 -- [2] The middle years, 1923-1945 -- [3] The later years, 1945-1965.

Classical work, with Hindi and Sanskrit commentaries, on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

Vysokoškolská učebnice člení látku do tří oddílů (K obecným otázkám umění a literatury; Poetika; Geneze literárního díla a literární proces), v nichž se pokouší vyložit teorii literatury z jednotného hlediska a podat klíč kteoretickému objasnění všech literárních děl a řad.

t. 1. Apo ton prōto skeptomeno anthrōpo mechri ton 6. aiōna M.Ch. -- t. 2. Apo ton 7. aiōna M.Ch. mechri to sēmera.

We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory (...) and the RNA World theory against each other. We use Simpson’s Paradox (SP) as a tool for challenging this objection. We will use models in various senses, ranging from taking them as representations of reality to treating them as theories/accounts that provide heuristics for probing reality. In this paper, we will frequently use models and theories interchangeably. Additionally, we investigate Conway’s Game of Life and contrast it with our SP-based approach to emergence-of-life issues. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of our view. A scientific model is testable in three senses: (i) a logical sense, (ii) a nomological sense, and (iii) a current technological sense. The SP-based model is testable in the first two senses but it is not feasible to test it using current technology. (shrink)

Resumen:La obra capital de Phillip Mainländer se compone de seis capítulos (Analítica de la facultad cognoscitiva, Física, Estética, Ética, Política, Metafísica) y un Anexo (Crítica de las doctrinas de Kant y Schopenhauer). Seis capítulos y un anexo que hacen gala de la intempestividad de su autor. De esa cualidad presente en pocos pensadores y que condiciona la valoración de su obra al paso del tiempo. De esa cualidad que permite pensar más allá de los límites que impone la época. Curiosamente (...) un pensador del siglo XIX ilumina los tiempos que corren. Unos tiempos signados por prácticas ecocidas y sus derivaciones ecosuicidas (Baquedano: 37-38), y cuyas primeras manifestaciones físicas sobre la naturaleza comenzaron, llamativamente, en dicho momento, a saber, en 1784 cuando James Watt patentó su máquina de vapor. (shrink)